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Abstract
The literature on the effect of labor income on portfolio choice overlooks that workers face
a risk of being forced to retire before their planned retirement age. Using the Health and
Retirement Study data, this paper finds the forced retirement risk to be significant and also
highly correlated with stock market fluctuations. A life-cycle portfolio choice model with the
estimated forced retirement risk shows that the labor income of those subject to the risk of
forced retirement becomes stock-like as individuals approach retirement. Therefore, contrary to
conventional wisdom, those who are still working but close to retirement should have a lower
share of risky assets in their financial portfolios than retirees do. Given that most financial
assets are held by middle-aged households, this finding gives an alternative explanation to the
risk premium puzzle.
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1 Introduction
An aging US population is giving rise to concerns over older Americans’ financial well-being in
retirement. Most of discussions on this topic focus on whether households build an adequate level
of savings to sustain a desirable level of consumption in retirement (see Poterba, Venti and Wise,
2011 and Poterba, 2014, for a good summary of the literature). What is less studied, however,
is how households should manage their financial savings as they approach their retirement. With
the transition from a defined-benefit pension system to a defined-contribution system, households
become more responsible for managing their own financial assets, but there is surprisingly little
guidance for older households on portfolio management that is based on both a correct understand-
ing of the risks that older households face and rigorous economic theory. In this paper, we examine
how older households should adjust allocations of their financial wealth between risky and safe
assets. In particular, we focus on how a specific risk they face at the end of their working life—the
risk of being forced into retirement before planned retirement age—affects their optimal financial
portfolio choice.
A long-standing rule of thumb for portfolio adjustment over age is that households should
reduce the share of risky assets in their financial portfolios as they approach retirement. Most
life-cycle funds in the current financial market are designed based on this principle. An often-cited
justification for this strategy relates to changes in the human capital of households (Jagannathan
and Kocherlakota, 1996).1 As households approach retirement, the size of their human capital
shrinks as they expect less future labor earnings. If their human capital is bond-like—i.e., if the
size of risk they have in their labor earnings is not large and/or if it is not strongly correlated with
stock returns—a decrease in human capital justifies a shift toward risk-free assets in their financial
portfolio because they are losing buffer against negative stock return shocks. Alternatively, if
their human capital is stock-like—i.e., if the risk in human capital is large and strongly correlated
with stock returns—an adjustment in the opposite direction can be justified. Therefore, correct
estimation of the size and characteristics of risk in households’ human capital is crucial in designing
the right portfolio adjustment strategy as retirement nears.
1Another common justification for this strategy is that younger households have a longer investment horizon and
therefore have more time to recover from any loss they might experience in the short term. However, as Samuelson
(1979) has shown, this argument is fallacious as long as stock returns are independent over time.
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Most of the literature on the role of human capital in financial portfolio choice models the risk
in human capital in terms of the uncertainties in the earnings process faced by households before
their retirement. Papers using this approach have concluded that human capital is bond-like since
the estimated risk is small and not strongly correlated with stock returns (see e.g., Viceira, 2001;
Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005; and Hugget and Kaplan, 2016). However, for older households
that are close to retirement, the timing of retirement represents a greater source of uncertainty
than their labor earnings process before their retirement. The estimated size of the risk in their
human capital can be much larger if households face a risk of being forced to retire before their
planned retirement age. Such a risk can make human capital much more stock-like if the risk of
forced retirement is correlated with the performance of the stock market. Existing papers in this
stream of literature fail to capture such risk because they assume that either the retirement timing
is fixed or households have full control over deciding when to retire (for an example of the latter,
see Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992).
In this paper, using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, we first document that
older Americans face a significant risk of being forced to retire before their planned retirement age.
We identify forced retirement using the responses to the question on the self-assessed reason for
retirement. About a quarter of retirements turn out to have been involuntary: individuals were
compelled to retire early for reasons that included health issues and their employers’ decisions.
Every year, on average, about 4 percent (2 percent) of households in the age range of 60 to 64
(55 to 59) who wanted to keep working are forced to retire. An involuntary early retirement often
involves a loss of several years’ worth of labor earnings. Most forced retirees do not return to the
labor market, and only a small fraction of forced retirees rely on unemployment insurance and
disability income. These findings imply that households close to retirement face a substantial risk
in their human capital. Even those households with relatively more wealth, who are more likely to
participate in the stock market, still face a significant forced retirement risk though less than those
at the bottom of the wealth distribution. Furthermore, we find a negative correlation between the
probability of being forced to retire and stock market performance. In other words, an increase in
the probability of forced retirement is associated with a large negative return in the stock market.
We then build a life-cycle portfolio choice model with the estimated forced retirement risk to
examine the implications of forced retirement risk for the optimal portfolio choice. In this model,
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households plan to work until a certain age, but they may be forced to retire before reaching that
age. The probability of forced retirement is a function of age and correlated with stock returns,
calibrated based on the findings from the HRS data. The results from the model suggest that
forced retirement risk makes the part of human capital that is exposed to this risk stock-like; in
such cases, the optimal portfolio adjustment for households is to increase the share of risky assets
in their financial portfolios as they approach and enter retirement. This strategy goes against
conventional wisdom. We also show that what is behind the stock-like human capital is not the
existence of the forced retirement risk per se but the correlation between stock returns and forced
retirement risk. Once we mute this correlation in our model, the effect of having a significant risk
of losing labor earnings is dominated by the effect of having a flow of income not correlated with
stock returns, so human capital becomes bond-like. Under the correlation, our main qualitative
result is robust to alternative calibrations and specifications of the model.
This paper relates to a number of literatures. First, this paper contributes to the literature on
household portfolio choice by documenting additional source of human capital risk that has not been
previously considered and by examining its implications for the optimal portfolio choice. Existing
studies have found that human capital is bond-like even under a counterfactually high correlation
between earnings shocks and stock returns (Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005;
and Hugget and Kaplan, 2016). Fagereng, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2016), by showing that firms
provide substantial wage insurance to workers, present one reason why shocks to the earnings
process are typically very small. On the other hand, Hugget and Kaplan (2016) show that the
left-skewed earnings growth distribution makes human capital more stock-like, but its effect is still
limited. None of these papers focus on the role of retirement timing uncertainty, which is the most
important source of risk in human capital for older households. In existing papers in this literature,
retirement timing is either fixed (Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005, for example) or determined
by households (Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992). In the latter case, households can use the
timing of retirement as a buffer against negative asset return shocks. Based on the observation
that retirement timing is not a choice variable but rather a shock for a significant fraction of older
households, we take the opposite extreme, where retirement timing is purely determined by demand
side in the labor market. We are not arguing that no household can use the retirement timing as
a buffer against negative asset return shocks at all. We choose this set-up to focus on how close
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human capital comes to being a risky asset for households that are exposed to this risk, which
has been neglected in the literature. There are several papers that focus on mechanisms through
which human capital can become more stock-like. Heaton and Lucas (2000) look at entrepreneurial
risk; Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldsten (2007) consider cointegration between wage and stock
returns; and Chang, Hong and Karabarbounis (2018) focus on uncertainty in the career paths of
young workers as a factor making their human capital stock-like. This paper shows a different
channel through which human capital becomes a close substitute for a risky asset.
Second, this paper contributes to a small but growing literature on the uncertainty in retire-
ment timing. Chan and Stevens (2001) show that in the US involuntary job loss is not rare, and
returning to the labor market after a job loss becomes significantly more difficult at older ages.
Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010) show that involuntary early retirement is common in European coun-
tries. Gorodnichenko, Song and Stolyarov (2013) and Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2016)
discuss macroeconomic determinants of retirement timing. By using the HRS data, we document
that in the U.S. the probability of being forced to retire is fairly high at older ages and negatively
correlated with stock returns. Some papers examine the economic implications of the uncertainty
in retirement timing. Smith (2006) and Dong and Yang (2016) point to involuntary retirement
to explain the “retirement consumption puzzle”—i.e., a downward shift in consumption expen-
diture at retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Friedman, 1957; Heckman, 1974; Haider
and Stephens, 2007; Battistin, Brugiavini, Rettore and Weber, 2009). Caliendo, Casanova, Gorry
and Slavov (2016) show that uncertainty about the timing of retirement is a major source of risk
to individuals’ lifetime consumption. This paper relates the uncertainty in retirement timing to
household portfolio choice.
Third, this paper relates to the literature on the age effect and the retirement effect on portfolio
choice. Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) document age effect on household portfolio choice. Rosen and
Wu (2004), Berkowits and Qiu (2006), Fan and Zhao (2009), Love and Smith (2010), Goldman and
Maestas (2013), and Lee (2015) examine how health status changes or health expenditure risks at
older ages affect household portfolio choice. Addoum (2017) studies how changes in negotiation
power between spouses around retirement affect portfolio allocation. Michaelides and Zhang (2017)
argue that setting the share of stock as a function of age or retirement horizon only may be
misleading under the presence of stock market predictability. This paper focuses on the role of forced
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retirement risk in understanding the optimal portfolio adjustment over age around retirement. Chen
and Nam (2016) provide empirical evidence that retirement contributes positively to households’
exposure to financial risks in their portfolios, consistent with the prediction from the current paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and defines the
variables used in this paper. Section 3 presents empirical evidence on the size of forced retirement
risk and its correlation with stock market returns. Section 4 sets up the life-cycle portfolio choice
model with forced retirement risk. Section 5 presents the optimal portfolio choice under the presence
of forced retirement risk. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data to estimate the size of the forced retirement
risk faced by older Americans. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a biennial panel study
that started its first survey in 1992. It contains observations from more than 26,000 households over
the age of 50 with information at the household and individual level that includes the participants’
demographic characteristics, health, income, wealth, and asset allocation. In particular, we take
advantage of the detailed questions on retirement in the HRS to analyze forced retirement risk. In
this section, we describe the key variables we use to determine forced retirement risk and explain
our sample selection criteria in detail.
2.1 Key Variables
Retirement Status
The HRS provides the current retirement status of survey respondents by asking the following
question:
Q: At this time do you consider yourself to be completely retired, partly retired, or not retired
at all?
A: 1) not retired; 2) completely retired; 3) partly retired
Based on the answers to this question, we classify as retirees both the respondents who consider
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themselves completely retired and those who answer that they are partly retired.2 In addition to
questioning respondents about their current retirement status, the HRS also asks for the year and
month of retirement:
Q: In what month and year did you [partly/completely] retire?
From the answers to this question and the ages of the participants in the survey year, we can
determine the year of retirement and age at retirement at an annual frequency, even though the
survey is biennial. For example, if a participant in the 2010 HRS whose age is 62 answered that
he/she retired in 2009, we estimate that his/her retirement age is 61 and retirement year is 2009.
Forced Retirement Indicator
Among the respondents who consider themselves partly or completely retired, the HRS gathers
additional information on whether they were forced into retirement:
Q: Thinking back to the time you [partly/completely] retired, was that something you wanted
to do or something you felt you were forced into?
A: 1) Wanted to do; 2) Forced into; 3) Part wanted, part forced
We classify respondents as forced retirees if in response to this question they replied 2) forced into.3
Using self-assessed reasons for retirement has a clear advantage over the conventional measure of
retirement uncertainty (i.e., the difference between the actual and expected ages of retirement; see
Caliendo, Casanova, Gorry and Slavov, 2016, for example). By considering self-assessed reasons for
retirement, we can exclude early retirements that are voluntary in identifying risks in retirement
timing. In the next section, we show how this measure is correlated with the conventional measure.
2.2 Sample Selection
The unit of observation in estimating forced retirement risk is a transition in the labor market
participation status for each respondent-year pair. Under the condition that a given respondent
2We classify the latter group as retirees because they typically have no labor earnings and rarely return to the
labor market.
3In our analysis sample (introduced in the next subsection), the number of retirees who chose 3) is only about a
quarter of those who chose 2).
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worked in year t, we examine 1) whether the respondent continued to work or retired in year t+ 1,
and 2) if the respondent retired that year, whether it was voluntary or involuntary.4
The forced retirement risk mainly matters when survey respondents are close to typical retire-
ment ages. Therefore, we restrict our sample to transitions that happened when respondents were
aged between 55 and 69. We include transitions from both married and single households, but we
restrict our sample to male respondents. The sample composition of the HRS data changed signifi-
cantly in 1998, when the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest-Old (AHEAD) cohort was
merged into the original HRS data. To maintain a consistent sample size throughout the survey
years, we exclude the sample before the 1998 survey. Our sample is further reduced as we exclude
observations from retirees who have not been asked the forced retirement question. After applying
our sample selection criteria, we obtain 15,366 transitions in labor market participation status that
occurred between 1998 and 2012.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we first establish that older workers face a significant forced retirement risk. A
large share of retirements turn out to be involuntary early retirements. A forced early retirement
typically means a loss of several years’ worth of labor earnings, rarely mitigated by returning to the
labor market later or by relying on unemployment insurance or disability income. Though there is
heterogeneity in the size of the forced retirement risk faced across households with different wealth
levels, even wealth-rich households face a sizable risk. We also show that the forced retirement
risk is strongly correlated with stock market performance. The probability of being forced to retire
tends to increase after having a downturn in the stock market.
3.1 Prevalence of Forced Retirement
We first summarize the proportion of retirements that are considered involuntary to show that
many households in the US do not have full control over their retirement timing. Table 1 shows
the number of retirements and the proportion of forced retirements by age and year of retirement.
4Hence respondents retired in year t do not appear in the sample in the analysis on transitions after year t + 1,
except for in our analysis of whether forced retirees return to the labor market.
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Overall, among all the retirements occurred during our sample period, the share of forced
retirement is about 28 percent. More than a quarter of US retirees report that they were forced
to retire against their will. The share of forced retirement also varies across age and year of
retirement. The proportion of forced retirements decreases with age: more than 40 percent of
retirements between 55 and 59 are forced retirements, but this number drops to 23 percent for
retirements between 65 and 69. This simply reflects the fact that more voluntary retirements occur
near and after typical retirement ages. The proportion of forced retirements also varies greatly
across years. For example, it reached the highest value of 45.6 percent in 2009, right after the
financial crisis. On the other hand, during the stock market boom in 1999, the proportion of forced
retirements was only 20 percent.
Table 1: Number of Retirements and Forced Retirees (FR) Ratio
Retirement Age
55-59 60-64 65-69 Total
Retirement # of % of # of % of # of % of # of % of
Year Retirements FR Retirements FR Retirements FR Retirements FR
1998 28 39.3 62 16.1 32 12.5 122 20.5
1999 41 31.7 124 18.5 62 14.5 227 19.8
2000 17 29.4 45 22.2 37 13.5 99 20.2
2001 23 30.4 114 21.1 48 18.8 185 21.6
2002 15 6.7 80 20 27 22.2 122 18.9
2003 36 50 88 22.7 52 26.9 176 29.5
2004 25 24 50 22 30 23.3 105 22.9
2005 27 48.1 72 13.9 66 21.2 165 22.4
2006 16 31.3 36 30.6 42 23.8 94 27.7
2007 39 43.6 51 19.6 58 20.7 148 26.4
2008 12 50 26 23.1 20 20 58 27.6
2009 44 52.3 62 43.5 59 33.9 165 42.4
2010 42 61.9 51 41.2 29 17.2 122 42.6
2011 44 45.5 86 31.4 40 27.5 170 34.1
2012 27 44.4 69 40.6 29 37.9 125 40.8
Total 436 42 1016 25 631 22.3 2083 27.7
Note: The data in this table are for retirements that occurred between 1998 and 2012 for male respondents aged between
55 and 69 at the time of retirement.
3.2 Forced Retirement Risk
While the previous subsection establishes that forced retirement is prevalent among older Amer-
icans, it does not provide a good measure of the likelihood of a given worker’s forced retirement
despite a willingness to continue working. As we will show in Section 4, this is the measure we
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need to use to investigate the implication of this risk for household portfolio choice. To measure
this risk, which we call the forced retirement risk, we use the following formula:
ForcedRetirementRiski,j =
N(ForcedRetireesi,j)
N(ForcedRetireesi,j) +N(Workingi,j)
, (1)
where N(ForcedRetireesi,j) is the number of individuals in age group i that are forced to retire
between the years j − 1 and j, and N(Workingi,j) is the number of people in age group i that
are working in both year j − 1 and year j. The denominator captures all the individuals who were
working in year j − 1 and wanted to keep working in year j. The numerator captures those who
could not do so because they were forced to retire.5
Based on this definition, we estimate the forced retirement risk by age group and year as shown
in Figure 1. On average, the risk of being forced to retire is not negligible. For the entire age
group considered, the average size of risk is 3.2 percent, meaning that every year 3.2 percent of
workers who want to keep working are forced to retire. The size of risk increases with age. The
forced retirement risk between the ages of 55 and 59 is 2.2 percent, while it increases to 4.9 percent
between the ages of 65 and 69. The estimates (at an annual frequency) suggest that, for a 60-year-
old worker who plans to retire at age 65, the chance of being forced to retire before the planned
retirement age is about 15 percent. Also, note that the size of forced retirement varies across years,
with noticeable increases right after the stock market downturns following the burst of the dot-com
bubble (in 2002) and the Great Recession (in 2008). We provide a more systematic examination of
the correlation between the forced retirement risk and stock market performance in Section 3.5.
3.3 Economic Significance of the Forced Retirement Risk
The probability of being forced to retire is in and of itself insufficient for establishing the economic
significance of the forced retirement risk. Another important factor is, conditional on being forced
to retire, how many years prior to the planned retirement age these individuals are forced to stop
working. If a household is forced to retire one year before the expected retirement age, that is a
significant loss of earnings, but still a much smaller shock compared to losing five years’ worth of
earnings.
5Voluntary retirees are not included in both the numerator and the denominator as we analyze of the risk that
matters to those who want to continue working.
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Figure 1: Forced Retirement Risk
This figure presents the probability of being forced to retire by age group and year. We have three age
groups: 55-59, 60-64, and 65-69. The probability of forced retirement is calculated using equation (1).
Table 2 shows the distribution of the difference between the actual and expected retirement
ages of forced retirees for each age group before age 65.6,7 Before discussing the result, however,
we should note that the expected retirement age measure in the HRS is very noisy. It is asked only
under a certain set of conditions. Hence, many respondents are not asked this question, so the
number of observations used in this analysis is small. Also, some households give unrealistically
high or low expected retirement ages, making observations in both tails less meaningful. Still, the
results suggest that a forced retirement often involves a loss of many years’ worth of expected labor
earnings. If forced to retire between ages 60 and 64, the median household loses two years’ worth
6In this subsection we examine the economic significant of forced retirement for those under age 65, which has
been historically considered as a normal retirement age.
7In case the same individual answered the expected retirement age question in multiple waves, we use the most
recent one observed before their forced retirement.
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of labor earnings, while a quarter of such households lose more than four years’ worth of labor
earnings. For those who are forced to retire before age 60, these numbers increase to six and seven
years, respectively.
Table 2: Distribution of Gaps between Actual and Expected Retirement Ages for Forced Retirees
Percentile N
10 25 50 75 90
55-59 -10 -7 -6 -3 0 193
60-64 -6 -4 -2 0 2 302
Note: This table tabulates the distribution of age gaps be-
tween actual and expected retirement ages for forced retirees.
In cases where individuals answered the expected retirement
age question in multiple waves, we use the most recent re-
sponses given before their forced retirement.
There are possible channels through which households can mitigate the impact of these shocks.
One way is to return to the labor market to work in a bridge job before fully retiring. Even with
the reduction in earnings compared to what they had in previous jobs, this will provide some buffer
against disastrous earnings losses. But we find that only about 8 percent of forced retirees return
to the labor market. Returning to the labor market being rare at old ages is also consistent with
the findings of a number of studies suggesting that the demand-side constraints of the labor market
hinder post-career employment (e.g., Hurd, 1996, Scott, 2004, and Kantarci and van Soest, 2008).
Conditional on returning to the labor market, workers also tend to make much less earnings than
what they had before forced retirement. At median, earnings from the new job is only 58% of
earnings from the previous job.8
Forced retirees may claim unemployment compensation or Social Security disability insurance,
reducing the financial impact of forced retirement. To figure out whether forced retirees take
advantage of this possibility, we use the claim information in the HRS data for unemployment and
worker’s compensation (UNWC) and Social Security disability insurance (SSDI).9
We first summarize the share of forced retirees who receive either UNWC or SSDI. As shown
8The denominator in the replacement rate calculation is the average of income reported in the two previous surveys
before retirement. Therefore, we dropped the respondents who did not participate in two consecutive survey waves
before retirement.
9More specifically, we use RwIUNWC and RwISSDI variables in the RAND version of HRS data. According to
the RAND HRS codebook, RwISSDI is the sum of the respondent’s income from Social Security disability (SDI) and
Supplement Security income.
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in Table 3, among respondents who change their working status from working to forced retired,
the proportions of UNWC recipients are 22.4 and 20.2 percent for the age groups 55-59 and 60-64,
respectively. The proportions of SSDI recipients are slightly lower: 18.0 and 13.3 percent for the age
groups 55-59 and 60-64, respectively. For comparison, we also provide the proportion of recipients
of UNWC and SSDI for all retirees (including both forced and voluntary retirees). Relative to all
retirees, the proportion of recipients of both UNWC and SSDI is higher among the forced retirees.
Still, relying on these sources of income is limited to a small fraction of the forced retirees.
Table 3: Share of UNWC/SSDI Recipients and Income Replacement Rate
Number of Recipients Income Replacement Rate
(Median)
Status Age Total UNWC SSDI UNWC SSDI
Working -> Retirees 55-59 554 67 (12.1%) 45 (8.1%) 10.6% 18.9%
60-64 1,481 148 (10.0%) 83 (5.6%) 12.2% 12.2%
Working -> Forced Retirees 55-59 183 41 (22.4%) 33 (18.0%) 12.9% 19.1%
60-64 361 73 (20.2%) 48 (13.3%) 17.7% 29.4%
Note: Respondents who have non-zero income are defined as recipients for each income category. The denominator
in the replacement rate calculation is the average of income reported in the two previous surveys before retirement.
Therefore, we dropped the respondents who did not participate in two consecutive survey waves before retirement.
Table 3 also provides the median income replacement rate for UNWC and SSDI recipients.
The replacement rate is estimated by dividing the income from UNWC or SSDI by the average of
income reported in the two previous surveys before retirement. The median income replacement
rates of UNWC are 12.9 percent and 17.7 percent for the age groups 55-59 and 60-64, respectively.
The income replacement rates of SSDI are higher (19.1 percent for 55-59 and 29.4 for 60-64). These
numbers are slightly higher than the replacement rates for retirees overall, but even among forced
retirees receiving these benefits, the replacement rates tend to be fairly low.
Overall, the low incidence rates of UNWC and SSDI benefits and the low replacement rates
of pre-retirement income among those receiving these benefits imply that the role of these income
sources in mitigating the impact of the forced retirement risk is limited. Additionally, unemploy-
ment compensation benefits are usually available for only up to 26 weeks.10 Because of this short
claim period compared to the difference between the actual and expected retirement ages for forced
retirees, the role of unemployment benefits in compensating for earnings losses is even more limited.
10According to Farber and Valletta (2015), UI benefits are normally available for 26 weeks in the United States
under the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program established under the Social Security Act
of 1935. While the duration of UI benefits was expanded in some states during and after the great recession, the
expansion was temporary.
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3.4 Heterogeneity in Forced Retirement Risk: By Wealth Level
The stock market participation rate has been increasing in past decades with the introduction of
defined-contribution pensions and individual retirement accounts. But still, many US households
near retirement have limited amounts of financial assets, and hence the question of optimal financial
portfolio choice is most relevant for the upper half of the wealth distribution among those nearing
retirement age (Poterba, Venti and Wise, 2011; Poterba, 2014; and Ameriks, Caplin, Lee, Shapiro
and Tonetti, 2014). If the forced retirement risk is significant only among wealth-poor households,
then its impact on household financial portfolio choice and hence on aggregate demand for stocks
should be limited.
To address this issue, we examine how the size of the forced retirement risk varies with wealth
level. We divide our sample into three groups based on self-reported household wealth and estimate
the size of the forced retirement risk for each group.11 Figure 2 shows forced retirement risk by
wealth group. As the figure shows, forced retirement risk decreases with wealth, and on average,
the forced retirement risk of the wealthiest group is 0.039, which is about 36 percent lower than the
risk for the least wealthy group. Still, the size of the forced retirement risk faced by the wealthiest
group is not negligible. Moreover, we find that the variation of the forced retirement risk over years
is similar across wealth groups, with the correlations being about 0.9 for any pair. In Section 5.4,
we show that our main finding is robust to the changes in the size of the forced retirement risk
within the range presented in this analysis.
3.5 Correlation with Stock Returns
Having established that older Americans face a significant forced retirement risk, we now turn to
the correlation between the size of the forced retirement risk and stock returns. Figure 1 showed
a surge in forced retirements after the beginnings of recessions in 2002 and 2007, so we conjecture
that an increase in the forced retirement risk follows downturns in the stock market.
To confirm this conjecture, we regress the probability of being forced to retire in each year
on the annual S&P 500 returns from the previous year. Admittedly, we only have data for 15
years so we cannot precisely estimate the correlation between the two variables. But the estimated
11For this exercise only, we estimate the forced retirement risk at a biannual frequency because we do not observe
household wealth between surveys.
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Figure 2: Forced Retirement Risk by Wealth
Note: This figure tabulates forced retirement risk by wealth group across different waves. Here we classify
wealth groups into High, Medium, and Low based on wealth terciles within each wave. We estimate the
forced retirement risk at a biannual frequency because we do not observe financial assets between surveys.
regression lines in Figure 3 suggest that the probability of being forced to retire increases after
having negative returns in the stock market. The estimated effect is not small. For example, after
having a positive 20 percent return on the S&P 500, the probability of a household between ages
60 and 64 being forced to retire is about 3 percent, while it goes above 5 percent after having a
negative 20 percent return on the S&P 500. The estimated slope for the age group 60-64 turns out
to be statistically significant notwithstanding the small sample size.
Older workers are forced to retire for various reasons. Poor health is often the reason for early
retirement, but massive layoffs during economic downturns can also force workers to retire earlier
than expected. Any correlation between stock returns and forced retirement should come from
forced retirement due to aggregate economic conditions, not from forced retirement due to health
issues that is a purely idiosycratic risk. We confirm this by using the question that specifically
15
Figure 3: Forced Retirement Risk and S&P Returns
Note: This figure presents the scatter plots together with the fitted lines from univariate linear regressions
of forced retirement risk on lagged S&P 500 annual returns for the age groups 55-59, 60-64, and 65-69. The
slope coefficients are summarized in Panel A of Table 4.
queries forced retirees about whether poor health was an important reason for their retirement.12
Among the 693 retirees in the sample who claim that they were forced to retire between 1998
and 2012, we find that 237 retirees (34.2%) consider poor health a very important reason for their
retirement. We take advantage of this information to distinguish forced retirement risk because of
health reasons from forced retirement risk out of other reasons. After we estimate the health-related
and non-health-related forced retirement risks separately for each year, we plot the relationship
between the estimated forced retirement risks and lagged stock returns in Figure 4. As expected,
12More specifically, the HRS asks whether poor health was a very important reason for your retirement, a moderately
important reason, somewhat important, or not important at all.
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Table 4: Slope Coefficients of Univariate Regressions of Forced Retire-
ment Risks on Lagged S&P 500 Annual Returns
55-59 60-64 65-69
Panel A. Total Forced Retirement Risk
-0.013 -0.031* -0.046
(0.018) (0.018) (0.031)
Panel B. Health-Related Forced Retirement Risk
-0.004 -0.007 0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Panel C. Non-Health-Related Forced Retirement Risk
-0.009 -0.024* -0.052**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.025)
Notes: This table summarizes the slope coefficient from univariate regressions of
forced retirement risk on lagged S&P 500 annual returns for different forced retire-
ment risks across age groups. Panel A reports the slope coefficients by using the to-
tal forced retirement risk. Panels B and C report the coefficients for health-related
forced retirement risk and non-health-related forced retirement risk, respectively.
The standard errors are reported in Parentheses. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level,* Significant at the 10 percent level.
non-health-related forced retirement risk is more strongly negatively correlated to the aggregate
stock return, while we no longer find such a relationship for health-related forced retirement risk. In
short, we establish two findings. First, the majority of forced retirements are not driven by health
conditions. Second, the forced retirements that are classified as “not-health-related” are likely to
be driven by pressures to leave during economic downturns, given its strong correlation with stock
returns.
3.6 Summary
The finding so far is that the probability of older Americans being forced to retire is not negligible,
and once a forced retirement occurs it accompanies significant financial losses. The losses are rarely
compensated by returning to the labor market or by relying on unemployment insurance or Social
Security disability income benefits. The risk is also not confined to a certain socio-economic status.
Even wealth-rich households still face a significant forced retirement risk, though somewhat smaller
than that of the average household. In addition, after having a negative return stock market,
households face an increased probability of being forced to retire. The size of the forced retirement
risk, and its correlation with stock returns, are the key elements in determining how much human
capital can be stock-like close to retirement. In the next two sections, we examine whether human
capital that is subject to forced retirement risk can be stock-like, by incorporating this risk into
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Figure 4: Health Related versus Non-Health Related Forced Retirement Risk and S&P Returns
(a) Health Related (b) Not Health Related
Note: These two figures are scatter plots together with fitted lines from univariate linear regressions of
forced retirement risk on lagged S&P 500 annual returns. Panel (a) uses health-related forced retirement
risk only, and Panel (b) uses non-health-related forced retirement risk only. The slope coefficients are
summarized in Table 4 Panels B and C, respectively.
the household’s financial portfolio choice problem.
4 Life-cycle Portfolio Choice Model
In this section, we build a life-cycle portfolio choice model to investigate how the forced retirement
risk documented in the previous section affects the portfolio choice of households. In this model, the
retirement age is exogenously determined and uncertain. This uncertainty may also be correlated
with stock returns. Otherwise, the model is close to standard models used in the literature, par-
ticularly in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005). Every period, households choose how to allocate
their savings between risky and safe assets as well as how much to consume and save. The model
features aggregate stock return risk, idiosyncratic income risk, and mortality risk.
4.1 Preference
Households maximize the following objective function:
E1
T∑
t=1
δt−1(
t−2∏
j=0
Pj{Pt−1C
1−γ
it
1− γ + b(1− Pt−1)
D1−γit
1− γ }), (2)
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where i is an index for an individual household, Cit the consumption in age t, Dit is the amount of
bequest that it will leave if it dies at age t, δ is the time discount factor, b is the weight that it puts
on bequest, γ is the risk aversion coefficient, and Pt is the survival probability between ages t− 1
and t.13 This is basically the present value sum of flow utility where households face uncertainty
over the length of lifetime and have a bequest motive.
4.2 Labor Income Process before Retirement
Households that are still working face idiosyncratic risks in their labor income. The labor income
process is as follows:
log(Yit) = f(t) + νit + εit (3)
εit ∼ N(0, σ2ε) (4)
νit = νi,t−1 + uit (5)
uit ∼ N(0, σ2u). (6)
The labor income (Yit) fluctuates around its conditional mean (f(t)), where the latter is a function
of age. The deviation between the actual labor income and its conditional mean is determined
by both the permanent shocks (νit) and temporary shocks (εit), where the former is modeled as
a random walk process. The innovation (uit) to the random walk process can be correlated with
stock returns, while temporary shocks are independent.
4.3 Retirement Income
For most defined benefit pension plans and also for Social Security, the retirement income depends
on the average earnings made over the household’s working life. Let Ψ denote the average labor
income the household had in its working life. While households are working, it evolves according
to:
Ψit =
(t− 1)Ψi,t−1 + Yit
t
. (7)
13As in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), we do not model the joint survival process of spouses. Hence the
model describes the optimal portfolio choice of single investors.
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If a household is retired at the normal retirement age K, it starts to receive a fixed retirement
income every year that is calculated as:
log(Yit) = logλ+ log(ΨiK), ∀t ≥ K. (8)
This models the social security and private defined benefit pension income of households, where λ
is the replacement rate.
If a household is forced to retire at age s that is lower than K, then the retirement income is
calculated as:
log(Yit) = logλs + log(ΨiK), ∀t ≥ s. (9)
where
ΨiK =
sΨis
K
(= sΨis + (K − s)0
K
). (10)
Hence, forced retirement affects the retirement income stream in two ways. First, it reduces ΨiK
that goes into the formula of the retirement income calculation because having zero earnings for
the years spent not working before the normal retirement age lowers the average earnings. This
captures the fact that for certain defined benefit pension plans (and also for Social Security income
up to a point), early retirement negatively affects the pension benefit accrual. Second, given ΨiK ,
forced retirement also affects the annual income flow by changing the replacement factor λs. We
calculate λs such that early retirement does not affect the expected present value sum of total
retirement income given ΨiK . In other words, we allow an actuarially fair early retirement benefit
from the age of forced retirement, regardless of when it happens.
In reality, how a forced retirement affects retirement income depends on the benefit formula of
defined pensions as well as their specific work history. In certain cases, either the effect of a forced
retirement on ΨiK is limited (e.g., Social Security income for those who worked more than thirty
five years) and/or an actuarially fair early retirement benefit is not available before certain ages
(e.g., Social Security income is not available before age 62). Later we will also examine robustness
of our main results to an alternative specification where a forced early retirement does not affect
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pension benefit accrual (ΨiK).
4.4 Uncertainty in Retirement Age
In the household portfolio choice literature, retirement age has been considered either to be fixed
(e.g., Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout, 2005 and Gomes and Michalides, 2005) or to be a choice of
households (Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992). But as we have shown in the previous sections,
many households are forced to retire, so for them retirement is not a buffer against shocks but
rather a shock itself. Furthermore, this uncertainty over retirement age can be correlated with
stock returns, which may amplify the implications of the forced retirement risk for portfolio choice.
We incorporate the forced retirement risk into our model, while not allowing households to
choose their retirement age. This means that retirement timing is purely determined by the demand
side in the labor market, an opposite extreme to what is assumed in Bodie, Merton and Samuelson
(1992). We are not arguing that no household can use the retirement timing as a buffer against
negative asset return shocks. We choose this set up to focus on how close human capital comes to
being a risky asset for households that are exposed to a forced retirement risk, an issue that has
been neglected in the literature.
We assume that the probability of being forced to retire in the following year, Ωt, is zero for
those who are not older than 55. For those who are still working between the ages of 56 and 63,14
the probability that they will be forced to retire in the following year is:
Ωt = Ω¯t + κtιt, (11)
where Ω¯t is the average value of this probability and κt determines how much this probability is
affected by aggregate shocks (both parameters are specific to age t), and ιt is an aggregate shock
that affects the risk of forced retirement.
14For those who are currently 64 years old, they do not face forced retirement risk since they plan to retire in the
next year.
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4.5 Financial Assets
The model has two financial assets, a risk-free asset and a risky asset. The risk-free asset has a
fixed gross return R¯f . The return process for the risky asset is:
Rt+1 − R¯f = µ+ ηt+1 (12)
ηt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2η) (13)
Corr(ηt+1, ut+1) = ρ, (14)
where µ is the risk premium and ηt+1 is a stock return shock. The stock return shock may be
correlated with a permanent income shock.
Households need to choose how to allocate their savings between the two assets. They cannot
borrow and they cannot short stocks. Hence, the share of assets invested in stocks, which we denote
by αit, needs to be between 0 and 1.
4.6 Optimization Problem
Let Xit be the cash-on-hand at the beginning of the period. It is determined as:
Xit =Wit + Yit (15)
Wi,t+1 =RPi,t+1(Wit + Yit − Cit) (16)
RPi,t+1 ≡αitRt+1 + (1− αit)R¯f (17)
where Wi,t is the assets at the beginning of the period, determined by the amount of savings in the
previous period and the performance of the overall portfolio, Rpit.
Using scalability of the problem, we normalize all the variables with respect to exp(νit). Let C˜t,
X˜t, and Ψ˜t be normalized values of Ct, Xt, and Ψt. Then the Bellman equation can be expressed
as following:
Vit(X˜it, Ψ˜it, Rett, RAt) = MaxC˜it≥0,0≤αit≤1[U(C˜it) + δPtEtexp(νi,t+1)
1−σVi,t+1(X˜i,t+1, Ψ˜i,t+1, Rett+1, RAt+1)]
(18)
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under constraints (3) - (17), where Ret is a dummy variable capturing whether the household is
retired or not, and RA captures the age of retirement once the household is retired.
4.7 Calibration
Table 5 summarizes the calibration of the parameters. For the parameters that also appear in
Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), we use the same values as in their benchmark model. Condi-
tional probabilities of survival (Pt) are from the mortality tables of the National Center for Health
Statistics. The model starts with age 20 and goes up to age 100.
Table 5: Calibration of parameters
Parameter Value
Own calibration
Mean of forced retirement risk (Ω¯) for age 55-59 0.02
Mean of forced retirement risk (Ω¯) for age 60-63 0.035
Effect of stock returns on forced retirement risk (κ) for age 55-59 0.013
Effect of stock returns on forced retirement risk (κ) for age 60-63 0.031
From Cocco et al. (2005)
Normal retirement age (K) 65
Discount factor (δ) 0.96
Risk aversion (γ) 10
Bequest motive (b) 0
Average labor income (f(t, Zit))*
Variance of transitory income shocks (σ2ε) 0.0738
Variance of permanent income shocks (σ2u) 0.0106
Correlation between (permanent) labor income shocks and stock returns (ρ) 0
Riskless rate (Rf − 1) 0.02
Risk premium (µ− 1) 0.04
Std. of stock return (ση) 0.157
Notes: Benchmark values used for the model.
* See Table 2 in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005).
Calibration of the forced retirement risk (Ωt) is one of the most important contributions of this
paper. Based on the evidence from the HRS, we calibrate Ω¯ to be 0.02 for the age range 55-59 and
Ω¯ to be 0.035 for ages 60-63. Also, based on the observed correlation patterns between the stock
returns and the forced retirement risks, we calibrate κ to be 0.013 for ages 55-59 and 0.031 for
ages 60-63, while letting ιt = −ηt. For example, when the return on the risky asset goes up by 10
percentage points, it reduces the forced retirement risk by 0.13 percentage point for ages 55-59 and
by 0.31 percentage point for ages 60-63. This calibration reproduces the regression lines estimated
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in Figure 3.
The hazard rates may seem trivial, but they are not. According to the calibrated parameters,
for a household that is working at age 55, the chance of being retired involuntarily before age
60—i.e., losing more than five years worth of earnings—is roughly 10 percent. The chance of being
forced to retire before the normal retirement age (65) goes up to above 20 percent. Hence, this is
indeed a significant risk that older households face before their retirement.
4.8 Computational Strategy
We solve this model using backward induction. The last period problem is trivial since it is a static
maximization problem (i.e., allocation between its own consumption in the last year and bequest).
This gives us the value function in the last year. Using this as the continuation value, we solve the
maximization problem of the penultimate year. This procedure is repeated until the first period.
In the maximization, we use grid search to determine the optimal combination of consumption
and portfolio choice. We use Gaussian quadrature to discretize the distribution of shocks and
numerically integrate over them. The continuous state spaces, X¯t and Ψ¯t, are discretized using 400
and 80 grid points, respectively. Increasing the number of grid points does not affect the results.
In evaluating the continuation values off the grid points, we use cubic interpolation.
5 Results
We first compare the policy function for the stock share in financial wealth between those who
are still working and those who are forced to retire. This comparison identifies how the part of
human capital that is exposed to forced retirement risk affects the portfolio choice of households.
We further investigate the mechanism behind the estimated effect. To be specific, we turn off the
correlation between forced retirement risk and stock return risk to examine whether the impact of
forced retirement risk on the portfolio choice mainly comes from the existence of the risk itself or
from the correlation. We then construct age profiles of wealth and stock share by simulating the
model to demonstrate that the optimal portfolio adjustment with age under the forced retirement
risk is dramatically different from the long-standing consensus that one should reduce investment
on risky assets as retirement approaches.
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5.1 Portfolio Choice under Forced Retirement Risk
Figure 5 plots the optimal stock share over normalized cash-in-hand (X˜). Panel (a) is for age
56 that is the lowest age when a household can be forced to retire, while Panel (b) is for age
60. The blue curve corresponds to a household that is still working and the red one corresponds
to a household that has been forced to retire at the age considered in each panel. Under the
normalization exp(νit) = 1, the annual labor earnings of a household that is still working are
approximately 25. Hence the wealth-to-income ratio range shown in the figure is between 0 and 10.
The most relevant range, in terms of the most likely value both in the model and in the empirical
data on stock holders (see Ameriks, Caplin, Lee, Shapiro and Tonetti, 2014 for the latter) is around
2-8 (i.e., X˜ in 50 - 200). One state variable that is not explicitly shown in the figure is the normalized
average labor income in the past (Ψ˜). In this figure, we assume Ψ˜ to be 20, which is close to the
average value of this variable in this age range.
The optimal stock share is a decreasing function of financial wealth regardless of current working
status. For households nearing retirement age, a large fraction of human capital is composed of
retirement income that is largely unaffected either by the performance of the stock market or
forced retirement.15 That part of human capital functions as a close substitute to a risk-free asset,
as investigated in Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), so the larger the financial wealth (i.e., the
lower the share of ‘safe’ human capital in the entire portfolio including human capital), the lower
the optimal share of risky assets in the financial portfolio.
The difference between the blue and red curves, on the other hand, reveals the role of the part of
human capital that is exposed to forced retirement risk. Note that the only difference between the
households represented by the blue curve and those represented by the red curve is that the former
have additional human capital because they are still working. Comparison of two households that
are identical except for their current labor force participation demonstrates how this part of human
capital, exposed to forced retirement risk, affects the portfolio choice. For both age 56 and age 60,
the optimal stock share is much lower for those who are still working. In other words, the part of
human capital exposed to the forced retirement risk is considered as a close substitute for the risky
asset, so holding this human capital crowds out risky asset investment in the financial portfolio.
15Recall that in the baseline model a forced retirement affects the retirement income only through its impact on
ΨiK and the magnitude of it is relatively small.
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Figure 5: Stock share comparison: workers vs. forced retirees
(a) Age 56
(b) Age 60
Note: In both panels, the blue curve is the optimal stock share for the households that are still working
while the red curve is the optimal stock share for the households that have been forced to retire under the
considered age in each panel. Under the normalization with exp(νit) = 1, the value of labor earnings of the
employed household is about 25 in this age range. We assume Ψ¯ = 20, which is close to the average value
in this age range.
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The impact is larger when households have fewer financial assets, and the effect is similar between
ages 56 and 60. For both ages, the difference between the two curves is about 20 percentage points
when the wealth-to-income ratio is 2 (cash on hand is 50), and it decreases to about 5 percentage
points when the wealth-to-income ratio is 8 (cash on hand is 200). As we show in Section 5.3, due
to this stock-like human capital, the optimal stock share increases with age rather than decreases,
contrary to conventional wisdom.
5.2 Role of Correlation between Stock Returns and Forced Retirement Risk
But what makes the part of human capital exposed to forced retirement risk a close substitute
for a risky asset? Is it the existence of the forced retirement risk per se, or is it the correlation
between this risk and the stock return risk? To investigate the mechanism behind the result in
the previous subsection, we revisit the comparison of the stock share policy function under no
correlation between the forced retirement risk and stock returns.
Once we turn off the correlation, we find the qualitatively opposite result (Figure 6). Now the
optimal stock share is higher for those who are still working, for both ages considered. Working
households still face the forced retirement risk. But as long as that risk is not correlated with stock
returns, the effect of having an additional risk is dominated by the effect of having a flow of income
that is uncorrelated with stock returns. Quantitatively, the size of the effect of having additional
income on the optimal stock share is relatively small, demonstrated by the small gap between the
blue and red curves.
By comparing the blue curves in Figure 5 and Figure 6, we can see that the effect of the
correlation between the forced retirement risk and stock returns on the portfolio choice is large.
One might find it puzzling because stock market fluctuations, though correlations are significant,
do not seem to largely affect the size of forced retirement risk according to our calibration. For
example, between the ages of 60 and 64, a negative stock return shock that corresponds to one
standard deviation (i.e., 10 percent loss) increases the probability of being forced to retire only
by 0.5 percentage point. However, that is a 15 percent increase in the hazard rate (from 3.5 to 4
percentage points). On the other hand, the correlation also means that the chance of having a large
negative stock return becomes much higher when the household is forced to retire. Given that it is
more likely to have a loss in its stock investment at the same time it loses a significant fraction of
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Figure 6: Stock share comparison: under no correlation between forced retirement risk and stock
return
(a) Age 56
(b) Age 60
Note: In both panels, the blue curve is the optimal stock share for the households that are still working,
while the red curve is for the households that have been forced to retire under the considered age in each
panel. Under the normalization with exp(νit) = 1, the value of labor earnings of the employed household is
about 25 in this age range. We assume Ψ¯ = 20, which is close to the average value in this age range.
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human capital, a household that faces the forced retirement risk hedges this risk by investing more
in the safe asset.
Note that in Viceira (2001), retired households almost always have a lower share of risky assets
in their financial portfolios compared to working households, even under an unrealistically high
correlation between permanent labor income shocks and stock return shocks. We show that one can
easily overturn his findings by incorporating the forced retirement risk and the correlation between
that risk and stock returns. On the other hand, Heaton and Lucas (2000) resort to entrepreneurial
income risk to explain the risk premium puzzle. We show that even non-entrepreneurs may view
(a part of) their human capital as a close substitute for stocks.
5.3 Age Profiles of Optimal Wealth and Stock Share
The above policy function comparisons examine how the optimal stock shares differ, conditional
on wealth, between those who are forced to retire and those who are still working. A forced
retirement, however, also reduces the level of wealth. To examine how a forced retirement affects
the optimal portfolio choice through its direct effect on the policy function and its indirect effect
through changes in wealth, we construct life-cycle profiles of wealth and the optimal stock share
around the retirement age (55-70).
Life-cycle profiles from the baseline model are shown in Figure 7. The blue curves assume
that the households work until the normal retirement age (65), while the red curves assume that
the households are forced to retire at age 60. The profiles are constructed as the averages of
1,000 simulations. For the wealth profiles, there is nothing surprising. Households accumulate
wealth while they are working and then decumulate once they retire. For the stock share, once the
households represented in the red curve retire, we see a wide gap between the two curves. Most
of this is driven by the policy function difference shown in Figure 5, while part of it comes from
the fact that the forced retirees now have less wealth, which increases the optimal stock share even
further compared to that of the working households. The gap shrinks as they approach the normal
retirement age, as the size of working households’ human capital that is subject to the forced
retirement risk decreases. The gap that remains after the normal retirement age results solely from
the different levels of wealth.
From this figure, we see that the optimal portfolio adjustment around the retirement age is
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Figure 7: Life-cycle profiles of wealth and stock share: baseline
(a) Wealth
(b) Stock share
Note: The blue curves assume that the households are not forced to retire until the normal retirement age
(65), while the red curves assume that the households are forced to retire at age 60. The profiles are
constructed as the averages of 1,000 simulations.
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almost the opposite of the conventional wisdom that households should reduce the share of risky
assets as they approach their retirement. Under the existence of forced retirement risk, households
increase their stock share as they approach the normal retirement age and when they are forced to
retire—i.e., as the size of human capital that is exposed to the forced retirement risk shrinks.
This pattern disappears when we turn off the correlation between forced retirement risk and
stock returns (Figure 8). The wealth profiles are almost the same as those from the baseline model.
In this specification, households on average accumulate more wealth as they can invest a larger
fraction of their financial savings in the risky asset, which provides a higher return on average. As
Figure 6 showed, the effect of the additional human capital of those who are still working on the
optimal stock share is fairly small under this specification. As a result, the stock-share profile does
not show a significant adjustment around retirement. Once the households represented in the red
curve are forced to retire, their stock share becomes smaller than that of those who are still working
due to the policy function difference shown in Figure 6. Later on, the relationship flips, again due
to the lower wealth level of forced retirees.
Note that if we further remove forced retirement risk itself (not just the correlation between the
risk and stock returns) then the model goes back to that of Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005).
The optimal stock share profile from that model is exactly the opposite to our baseline result and
consistent with the conventional wisdom: It monotonically decreases with age until retirement. The
comparison between our baseline result and that from Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) thus
highlights the role of forced retirement risk (and its correlation with stock returns) in generating
the optimal portfolio adjustment patterns that go against the conventional wisdom.
5.4 Alternative Specifications
In this section, we examine robustness of the main results to alternative specifications of the model.
5.4.1 No effect of a forced retirement on Ψ
In the baseline model, we assume that forced retirement reduces the average labor income variable
(Ψ) used in retirement income calculation as having zeros earnings before the normal retirement
age reduces the average earnings until that age. Whether this is a realistic description of the defined
benefit pensions and Social Security or not depends on the exact formula of benefit calculations and
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Figure 8: Life-cycle profiles of wealth and stock share: under no correlation between forced retire-
ment risk and stock return risk
(a) Wealth
(b) Stock share
Note: The blue curves assume that the households are not forced to retire until the normal retirement age
(65), while the red curves assume that the households are forced to retire at age 60. The profiles are
constructed as the averages of 1,000 simulations.
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the work history of workers. For example, if benefit accrual under a defined-benefit pension plan is
a function of the number of service years and the average earnings over a certain number of years
with the highest earnings, then forced retirement can affect the pension benefit accrual directly
by reducing the number of service years (and also by reducing the average highest earnings if the
individual’s earnings have been increasing over time). On the other hand, if someone has been
working for more than 35 years, then the effect of a forced retirement on Ψ can only be marginal
for Social Security income.
To examine the opposite extreme relative to what has been assumed in the baseline model, we
reexamine the optimal portfolio choices assuming that forced retirement does not affect Ψ. In other
words, if someone is forced to retire at age s < K, then we use ΨK = Ψs in the calculation of
retirement income. Examining sensitivity of the result to this aspect of the model specification also
informs us about the potential effects of unemployment insurance and disability income benefits
that partly compensate for earnings losses (Section 3.3).
Under this specification, we find the same qualitative result as in the baseline model (Figure 9,
Panel (a)).16 Those who are still working should invest less in stocks than those who are forced
to retire. Quantitatively, the human capital of those still employed is less stock-like compared to
the baseline. The gap between the two curves becomes negligible at high wealth-to-income ratios,
though for a large part of the wealth-to-income ratio range that is common among stockholders
(between 2 and 8, which corresponds to between 50 and 200 in X¯), the result still suggests that
households should have a lower stock share before retirement. By comparing with Figure 5, we can
see that the gap between the blue and red curves in this specification is about 40 percent smaller for
most of this wealth range. Note that in the baseline model a forced retirement affects households’
financial resources via two channels: on one hand through the lost labor earnings and on the other
hand through the reduced retirement income (through its effect on Ψ). The current specification
isolates the effect through the first channel, and it shows that the first channel accounts for about
60 percent of the effect in the baseline model.
16All the panels in Figure 9 consider comparisons of stock share between those who are still working and those who
are forced to retire at age 60.
33
Figure 9: Stock share comparison: Alternative specifications (age 60)
(a) No effect on Ψ (b) Smaller forced retirement risk
(c) With a bequest motive
Note: In all the panels, the blue curve is the optimal stock share for the households that are still working
while the red curve is the optimal stock share for the households that are forced to retire under the
considered age in each panel. Under the normalization with exp(νit) = 1, the value of labor earnings of the
employed household is about 25 in this age range. We assume Ψ¯ = 20, which is close to the average value
in this age range.
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5.4.2 Under a Smaller Forced Retirement Risk
In the baseline model, the calibration of the forced retirement risk is based on our estimates from
the representative sample of the older Americans in the HRS. One might think that a more proper
calibration would be based on a part of the population that is more likely to participate in the stock
market—i.e., those with relatively more wealth. Though the exercises with the baseline specification
are meaningful given that stock market participation becomes more common with the transition
from the defined-benefit to the defined-contribution pension system, we also examine whether our
main result still holds under a smaller forced retirement risk, calibrated from the high wealth group
defined in Section 3.4. To be more specific, we recalibrate the level of forced retirement risk to
be 70 percent of the baseline value (i.e., reducing both Ω¯ and κ by 30 percent from the baseline
values).
Panel (b) of Figure 9 shows that the additional human capital of working households is still
stock-like even when the size of forced retirement risk is smaller. The result is almost identical to
that in Panel (a). The gap between the two curves becomes negligible at high wealth-to-income
ratios, but for a large part of the wealth-to-income ratio range that is common among stockholders,
households that are still working should invest less in the risky asset.
5.4.3 With a Bequest Motive
Following Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), we turn off the bequest motive in the baseline
model by assuming b = 0. Here we examine whether our main result is robust under a bequest
motive by setting b at 3, which is the median value considered in the robustness check exercises in
Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005).17
A bequest motive does not change our main result (Figure 9, Panel (c)). Households that are
still working should invest less of their wealth in stocks than those who are already retired. The gap
between the two curves is comparable to the one from the baseline (Figure 5). The levels of both
curves are lower with a bequest motive, which means that a bequest motive makes households less
willing to take risks in their investments. This result is intuitive. Retirement income from defined-
17b = 3 implies that the household wants to finance three years of consumption for their descendants. For example,
if the household is at its last year and there is no uncertainty, it will consume one fourth of its wealth and then leave
the remainder as a bequest.
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benefit pensions and Social Security functions as a good hedge against longevity and bad investment
outcomes for those mainly concerned with financing their own consumption. For those who have a
strong bequest motive, retirement income cannot be a good hedge against bad investment outcomes
because households cannot bequeath unrealized retirement income. If a household experiences a 10
percent loss in its investments and dies soon after that, the bequest will be reduced approximately
by 10 percent and the retirement income flow that it could have had conditional on surviving does
not help protect the bequest.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we find that older Americans face a significant forced retirement risk that is strongly
correlated with stock returns. Using a life-cycle portfolio choice model with the estimated forced
retirement risk, we show that the forced retirement risk makes the part of human capital that is
exposed to such risk stock-like, resulting in a lower optimal stock share for workers than for retirees.
This portfolio adjustment is almost the opposite of the conventional wisdom that households should
reduce their stock shares as they approach retirement.
Our finding also provides an alternative explanation for the risk premium puzzle. Households
right before their retirement reach the highest levels of financial wealth, on one hand, and but they
face a forced retirement risk on the other hand. Hence their reduced demand for stocks, attributable
to forced retirement risk, should have a large impact on asset pricing. It is for future research to
extend our framework to a general equilibrium model and quantitatively examine the contribution
of forced retirement risk to the risk premium.
36
References
[1] Addoum, Jawad M. (2017): “Household Portfolio Choice and Retirement,” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 99, 870-883.
[2] Ameriks, John, Andrew Caplin, Minjoon Lee, Matthew D. Shapiro and Christopher Tonetti
(2014): “The Wealth of Wealthholders,” NBER Working Paper, No. 20972.
[3] Battistin, E., Brugiavini, A., E. Rettore and G. Weber (2009): “The Retirement Consump-
tion Puzzle: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Approach,” The American Economic
Review, 99, 2209-2226.
[4] Benzoni, Luca, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, and Robert S. Goldstein (2007): “Portfolio Choice
over the Life-Cycle when the Stock and Labor Markets are Cointegrated,” Journal of Finance,
62, 2123-2167.
[5] Bernheim, B. Douglas, Jonathan Skinner and Steven Weinberg (2001): “What Accounts for
the Variation in Retirement Wealth among US Households,” The American Economic Review,
91, 832-857.
[6] Bodie, Zvi, Robert C. Merton, and William F. Samuelson (1992): “Labor Supply Flexibility
and Portfolio Choice in a Life Cycle Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16,
427-449.
[7] Caliendo, Frank N., Maria Casanova, Aspen Gorry, and Sita Slavov (2016): “The Welfare
Cost of Retirement Uncertainty,” NBER Working Paper, No. 22609.
[8] Chang, Yongsung, Jay H. Hong, and Marios Karabarbounis (2018): “Labor Market Un-
certainty and Portfolio Choice Puzzles,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 10,
222-262.
[9] Chen, Guodong and Tong Yob Nam (2016): “Venture or Safety? Retirement and Portfolio
Choice,” Mimeo.
[10] Cocco, Joao F., Francisco J. Gomes, and Pascal J. Maenhout (2005): “Consumption and
Portfolio Choice over the Life Cycle,” Review of Financial Studies, 18, 491-533.
37
[11] Dong, Yingying and Dennis Tao Yang (2016): “Mandatory Retirement and the Consumption
Puzzle: Disentangling Price and Quantity Declines,” Mimeo.
[12] Dorn, David and Alfonso Sousa-Poza (2010): “‘Voluntary’ and ‘Involuntary’ Early Retirement:
An International Analysis,” Applied Economics, 42, 427-438.
[13] Farber, Henry S., and Robert G. Valletta. (2015): “Do Extended Unemployment Benefits
Lengthen Unemployment Spells? Evidence from Recent Cycles in the US Labor Market,”
Journal of Human Resources, 50, 873-909.
[14] Fagereng, Andreas, Luigi Guiso, and Luigi Pistaferri (2016): “Portfolio Choices, Firm Shocks
and Uninsurable Wage Risk,” NBER Working Paper, No. 22883.
[15] Friedman, Milton, (1957): “A Theory of the Consumption,” Princeton University Press.
[16] Gomes, Francisco and Alexander Michaelides (2003): “Portfolio Choice with Internal Habit
Formation: A Life-cycle Model with Uninsurable Labor Income Risk,” Review of Economic
Dynamics, 6, 729-766.
[17] Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, Jae Song, and Dmitriy Stolyarov (2013): “Macroeconomic Determi-
nants of Retirement Timing,” NBER Working Paper, No. 19638.
[18] Gustman, Alan L., Thomas L. Steinmeier, and Nahid Tabatabai (2016): “A Structural Anal-
ysis of the Effects of the Great Recession on Retirement and Working Longer by Members of
Two-Earner Households,” NBER Working Paper, No. 22984.
[19] Haider, Steven J. and Melvin Stephens (2007): “Is There a Retirement-Consumption Puzzle?
Evidence Using Subjective Retirement Expectations,” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
89, 247-264.
[20] Heaton, John and Deborah Lucas (2000): “Portfolio Choice and Asset Prices: The Importance
of Entrepreneurial Risk,” Journal of Finance, 55, 1163-1198.
[21] Heckman, James (1974): “Life Cycle Consumption and Labor Supply: An Explanation of the
Relationship Between Income and Consumption over the Life Cycle,” The American Economic
Review, 64, 188-194.
38
[22] Huggett, Mark and Greg Kaplan (2016): “How Large is the Stock Component of Human
Capital,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 22, 21-51.
[23] Hurst, Erik (2008): “The Retirement of a Consumption Puzzle,” NBER Working Paper, No.
13789.
[24] Jagannathan, Ravi and Narayana R. Kocherlakota (1996): “Why Should Older People Invest
Less in Stocks than Younger People?,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review,
Summer 1996.
[25] Michaelides, Alexander and Yuxin Zhang (2017): “Stock Market Mean Reversion and Portfolio
Choice over the Life Cycle,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52, 1183-1209.
[26] Modigliani, Franco and Richard Brumberg, (1954): “Utility Analysis and the Consump-
tion Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data,” The Collected Papers of Franco
Modigliani 6.
[27] Poterba, James (2014): “Retirement Security in an Aging Population,” American Economic
Review, 104, 1-30.
[28] Poterba, James, Steven Venti, and David Wise (2011): “The Composition and Drawdown of
Wealth in Retirement,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 95-118.
[29] Samuelson, Paul A. (1979): “Why We Should Not Make Mean Log of Wealth Big Though
Years to Act Are Long,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 3, 305-307.
[30] Schmidt, Lawrence D.W. (2016): “Climbing and Falling Off the Ladder: Asset Pricing Impli-
cations of Labor Market Event Risk,” University of Chicago Working Paper.
[31] Smith, Sarah (2006): “The Retirement-Consumption Puzzle and Involuntary Early Retire-
ment: Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey,” The Economic Journal, 116, C130-
C148.
[32] Viceira, Luis M. (2001): “Optimal Portfolio Choice for Long-Horizon Investors with Nontrad-
able Labor Income,” Journal of Finance, 56, 433-470.
39
